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Throughout American history, the problem of poverty has been a controversial 
moral and political dilemma. Unfortunately, the majority of persons living in poverty are 
children, who are unable to change their situation. According to the 1986 Current 
Population Survey, 60.35% of the persons living in poverty were under the age of 18.1 
Social policies indicate that policy makers sense a moral obligation to provide some 
sort of material assistance to the needy. However, with the exception of two states, 
welfare benefits are not sufficient to raise a family above the poverty line2. The public 
consensus is that current welfare policies are in need of reform, but there is little 
agreement about how it should be done. 
Contemporary theories of distributive justice have also addressed the issue of 
the distribution of basic goods and services to the least advantaged in society. These 
theories range in scope from strict egalitarianism to desert-based principles. 3 In John 
Rawls' A Theory of Justice, he proposes a theory of distributive justice which he calls 
justice as fairness. 4 Rawls' theory concentrates upon the basic structure of society and 
the way in which social institutions regulate basic rights and duties. Rawls maintains 
I Beyond Welfare' New Approaches to the problem ofpoverty in America. Ed. Harrell R. 
Rodgers, Jr. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1988. p. 7. 
2Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, Overview ofEntitlement 
Programs: 1994 Green Book, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govermnent Printing 
Office, 1994. P. 366. 
3Strict egalitarianism demands that each person should hold the same level of material 
goods and services. In contrast, desert-based principles of distributive justice assert that people 
deserve certain material goods and services in accordance with their contribution to society. 
4Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory ofJustice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
I 
that a distribution of primary social goods within a society must be done in order to 
maximize the position of those who are the worst off in society.5 Although Rawls' theory 
of justice represents an abstract description of a just society, I maintain that this theory 
provides an excellent theoretical framework with which to analyze the reformation of 
the current American system of public assistance. 
In my examination distributive justice and public assistance benefits, I will take 
the following path. First, I will present an overview Rawls' theory of justice, 
concentrating upon the distribution of primary social goods in accordance with the two 
principles of justice established within the original position. In an examination of the 
first principle of justice, I will also present Rawls' distinction between equal liberty and 
the worth of liberty. This distinction is important as it relates to the inequality of the 
worth of liberty to the least advantaged members of society. In understanding the 
second principle of justice it is necessary to examine the definition of primary social 
goods, as well as Rawls method of fairly distributing these goods. I will then contrast 
Rawls' justice as fairness with the utilitarian description of a just society. I will also 
present the egalitarian implications of Rawls' theory as they apply to current welfare 
reform issues. By placing my examination of the American welfare system within the 
theoretical framework of justice as fairness, I will illustrate the benefit of this theory in 
the analysis of the allocation of resources to alleviate poverty, homelessness, and 
other afflictions of the poor. 
SThis distribution must be done in accordance with a principle of equality. A discussion of 
this principle can be found later in this paper. 
II 
In John Rawls' A Theory of Justice, he seeks to incorporate the concept of 
equality with an extensive theory of justice. Rawls refers to his theory of justice as 
"justice as fairness.' 6 By using this title, Rawls is not asserting that justice and fairness 
are the same thing, but rather that the principles of justice are determined within an 
original conceptual framework that is fair. This original framework is called the "original 
position of equality," and is a hypothetical situation in which rational persons, acting as 
agents on behalf of the concrete members of a society, choose the principles of justice 
behind a "veil of ignorance." 7 Rawls maintains that decisions made in the original 
position are fair because within the veil of ignorance, people are not aware of their 
social status, natural abilities, intelligence, personal conception of the good, individual 
psychological features, or their age. In addition, Rawls explains that behind the veil of 
ignorance, people are also ignorant of the particular facets of their own society. 
Rawls maintains that all members persons would be similarly situated within the 
original position and the principles chosen would be those which are best for the entire 
community; because no one would be aware of their particular situation, there would be 
no way in which a person could decide upon a principle of justice in such a way that it 
would be to her/his advantage. Fred D'Agostino explains the impartiality that Rawls' 
theory aims to achieve with the following analogy: 
My agent A cannot hold out for some social settlement that favors 
people with those characteristics; s1he doesn't know what they are. 
Slhe will therefore have to protect my interests, as s1he must as 
6Ibid., p.12-13.
 
%id., p. 12.
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their trustee, only by holding out for a social settlement in which no 
one's interests are given short shrift. ' 
This does not mean, however, that people in the original position are completely 
ignorant of any facts about society. On the contrary, Rawls contends that the people in 
the original position are knowledgeable about the general aspects of human societies, 
such as economics, political theory, psychology, sociology, etc. Without this general 
knowledge, they would not be able to make informed decisions about any principles of 
justice, nor would they be able to gauge the implications of their decisions.9 ln addition, 
the agents within the original position would not see themselves as individuals isolated 
from society. Instead, they would view themselves as related to and responsible for the 
subsequent generations of persons within that community. 
Rawls contends that because the agents within the original position would be 
similarly situated, there is no reason for an individual agent to expect more than an 
equal share of social goods and liberties. 10 Therefore, Rawls asserts that agents within 
the original position would first decide upon a principle of equality. This first principle 
dictates that, "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty 
'D'Agostino, Fred. 1996. "Original Position." Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy (23 
Feb. 1996): 5 pp. Online. Internet. 18 Mar 1997. 
"Rawls, p. 137-8. 
l"Because the agent has no knowledge of herlhis social or economic status, agreeing to a 
principle that would divide social goods un-equally would not be rational. Rawls contends that no 
rational person would agree to anything less than an equal share of social goods and basic 
liberties. (Rawls, p. 150) 
IV 
compatible with a similar liberty for others." 11 In addition, Rawls maintains that a 
second principle would be adopted by agents within the original position. The second 
principle states, "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to 
positions and offices open to aiL" 12 
Rawls defines the liberties guaranteed by the first principle as, "... roughly 
speaking, political liberty (the right to vote and to be eligible for public office) together 
with freedom of speech, assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; 
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the rule of law." 13 The second 
principle is primarily concerned with the distribution of wealth and income, and the 
structure of social institutions. Rawls explains that the first principle always takes 
priority over the second. These two principles of justice are specific points of a more 
general theoretical framework which dictates that, "All social values...are to be 
distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of any, or all, of these values is to 
everyone's advantage." 14 Inequalities in basic liberties cannot be justified by any 
greater economic advantages, whereas social and economic inequalities may be 
justified by adherence to the first principle. 
"Rawls, p. 60.
 
12Ibid., p. 60.
 
"Ibid., p. 61.
 
"Ibid.
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Because of his emphasis upon the basic structure of society and social 
institutions, Rawls limits his discussion of liberty to the legal and constitutional 
restrictions upon liberty. He explains that for the purposes of this examination, liberty 
can be defined in regards to three areas: (1) the free agent, (2) the restrictions that the 
agent is free from, and (3) what the agent is free to do or not to dO. 15 Consequently, a 
person is at liberty to perform an action [Xl when that person is free from restrictions to 
either perform X or not to perform X, and when this freedom is protected from the 
interference of other individuals. In addition, Rawls contends that there must be a legal 
duty, on the part of the government and other individuals, not to interfere with a 
person's liberty to perform X. This legal duty of non-interference is not valid unless the 
liberty in question falls within the boundaries of the first two principles of justice. 
Therefore, because an action such as slavery would not be a liberty that satisfies the 
principles of justice, there would be no legal duty of non-interference. 16 
Rawls asserts that basic liberties must then be examined as a system, rather 
than individually evaluating each one. This approach follows his structural concept of 
justice and is necessary because liberties often conflict with each other. He notes that 
the worth of a particular liberty is dependent upon the boundaries of other liberties. A 
clear example of this can be found in the freedom of assemble. While Rawls lists this 
as a basic liberty, he would distinguish this freedom from specific rules of conduct such 
·'Ibid., p. 202.
 
16Ibid.
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as mob action, obstruction, or violent protest. 17 These specifications restrict the 
freedom of assembled groups, but are necessary so that all individuals are able to 
benefit from this freedom. 16 
Although philosophical discussions on the subject of liberty often concentrate on 
the definitive meaning of liberty, Rawls chooses instead to concentrate upon the value 
or worth of liberty. He maintains that equal liberty and the worth of liberties are two 
distinctly different concepts. Rawls views liberties as the complete system of equal 
citizenship, whereas the worth of liberties are to be weighed in accordance to a groups 
ability to advance within this complete system. Assume for example, that there is a 
basic liberty to interstate travel; although everyone would be entitled to this liberty, only 
those who possessed the means to travel would be able to exercise this liberty. 
Consequently, the worth of this specific liberty would be greater for those who had the 
means to enjoy it, in comparison to those who did not possess the same means to 
interstate travel. Therefore, although the first principle of justice calls for an equal right 
to basic liberties, it does not require that these liberties carry an equal worth among 
individuals. 
Rawls considers the first principle to be clearly stated and easily interpreted. 
However, the ambiguity of the language in the second principle leads to interpretive 
difficulty. Specifically, Rawls asserts that the phrase "everyone's advantage," contains 
l7The freedom of assembly example is not to be confused with civil disobedience, which 
Rawls defines as public non-violent political activity. Later in the text, Rawls develops a three 
point justification for civil disobedience and the duty ofjustice. (Rawls, p. 371-377) 
"Rawls, p. 203. 
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two possible interpretations. The phrase, "everyone's advantage" can either be 
interpreted as a principle of efficiency, or as a difference principle. The principle of 
efficiency would dictate that social structures are designed in such a way that there is 
no way to improve the socioeconomic situation of one group in society without 
declining the socioeconomic condition of another group. This principle is problematic 
when applied to situations in which there is an unequal distribution of primary goods 
and liberties. For example, in holding with the principle of efficiency, the exploitation of 
low wage labor for the profit of the employer would be deemed efficient; there would be 
no way to reform such an institution without declining the socioeconomic condition of 
the employer. 19 Therefore, Rawls finds that the principle of efficiency is defective in that 
it would allow for situations that are efficient, rather than just. 
Interpreting this point as a difference principle would mean that society is to be 
structured so that the least advantaged in society can reasonably expect to benefit from 
the inequalities resulting from the basic social structure. In order for the difference 
principle to produce situations that are just, it is first necessary to ensure that society is 
structured in such a way that there is a fair equality of opportunity. This equality of 
opportunity would guarantee that persons with the same abilities and motivation have 
an equal chance of holding institutional positions of power, regardless of the 
socioeconomic position that they came from.20 Rawls refers to this interpretation as the 
democratic interpretation of equality, because it combines a fair equality of opportunity 
'''Ibid., p. 71.
 
2°Ibid., p. 83.
 
VIII
 
with the difference principle. Rawls explains that, "This principle removes the 
indeterminateness of the principle of efficiency by singling out a particular position from 
which the social and economic inequalities of the basic structure are to be judged."21 
Once the interpretive boundaries of the second principle of justice are 
established by use of the difference principle, Rawls then examines the manner in 
which social goods should be distributed. He asserts that the distribution of social 
goods and basic liberties is a purely procedural issue. He explains that perfect 
procedural justice involves two essential properties. 
First, there is an independent criterion for what is a fair division, a 
criterion defined separately from and prior to the procedure which 
is to be followed. And second, it is possible to devise a procedure 
that is sure to give the desired outcome. 
The main assumption is that within the system of procedural justice, there is a method 
with which to determine what is just, and a set procedure to use to achieve it. 22 Rawls 
maintains that if a society begins with an underlying fair equality of opportunity and 
designs social institutions that support this equality, then the resulting pattern of 
distribution satisfies the difference principle. He states, "The intuitive idea is to design 
the social system so that the outcome is just, whatever it happens to be, at least so 
long as it is within a certain range."23 Therefore, as long as social institutions are 
2%id., p. 75. 
22To contrast this point, Rawls uses the comparison of a perfect system of procedural 
justice, to an imperfect system of procedural justice. An imperfect procedural justice is one in 
which there is no established procedure that is guaranteed to produce a just outcome. 
23Rawls, p. 85. 
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structured correctly, the distribution procedures that follow from these institutions are 
most likely just. However, Rawls notes that it is the principle of fair opportunity that 
provides stability to this system of distributive justice; without this principle there is no 
way to guarantee that the distribution of primary social goods follows pure procedural 
justice.24 
Rawls defines primary goods as things which are necessary means to a rational 
man's desired end. In spite of individual differences in 'life plans', Rawls maintains that 
there are certain primary goods that are commonly desired by rational individuals. He 
states, "Greater intelligence, wealth and opportunity for example, allow a person to 
achieve ends he could not rationally contemplate otherwise. ,,25 The more of these 
goods that a person has, the greater chance that person has of achieving her/his ends. 
In the discussion of distributive justice, Rawls focuses upon those primary goods which 
are regulated by the structure and laws of the institutions of society. He refers to these 
regulated primary goods as primary social goods because of this connection to social 
institutions. 
A fundamental difficulty with the distribution of primary social goods is 
establishing a method with which to determine what a fair distribution would be. 
According to the serial order of the two principles of justice, basic liberties and 
opportunities are both consistently equal. The only primary social goods that would 
vary in their distribution are authoritative powers, income, and wealth. Therefore, 
24Ibid., p. 87.
 
"Ibid., p. 93.
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Rawls contends that it is necessary to institute an index by which to measure the value 
of different primary social goods. He states that because of the difference principle, 
''The only index problem that concerns us is that for the least advantaged group. The 
primary goods enjoyed by other representative individuals are adjusted to raise this 
index, subject of course to the usual constraints."26 Therefore, he asserts that in order 
to ensure a fair distribution of primary social goods, the agents in the original position 
need only focus upon the ways in which the distribution of such goods affects the least 
advantaged. 
Rawls' justice as fairness implies that on a basic level there should be some 
areas of equality among persons. There are many moral theories which propose that a 
just society is dependent upon a certain amount of equality among individuals. Within 
this group of theories of justice, utilitarianism has remained the subject of contemporary 
philosophical discussion. Rawls seeks to present an alternative to the utilitarian 
doctrines that have evolved in the field of social ethical theory. He spends a 
considerable amount of time contrasting justice as fairness to the classic utilitarian 
tradition. 27 The most obvious distinction is the theoretical difference between the 
teleological and the deontological approaches to moral theory. 
Although there are many different utilitarian theories, one common assertion in 
2·Ibid., p. 93-94. 
27Although Rawls goes into considerable detail in contrasting these two theories, for the 
purposes ofthis paper, I have chosen to limit the comparison to two main theoretical differences; 
(1) the teleological vs. deontological approach, and (2) the use of principles appropriate on an 
individual basis for the evaluation of a whole society, rather than applying social principles to the 
individual. 
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these theories is that an action is right if it maximizes the good. In this assertion, the 
"good" is defined independently from and prior to what is right. In John Stuart Mill's 
utilitarian philosophy, he exemplified this doctrine through what he referred to as the 
greatest happiness principle (GHP). This principle dictates that an action is right in so 
far as it tends to produce the greatest happiness and is wrong as it produces the 
opposite of happiness.28 Therefore, utilitarianism can be defined as a teleological ethic 
which relies upon the consequence of an action to determine whether or not the action 
is right. Mill contends that the greatest sum of happiness or pleasure is the measure 
upon which to judge your action. If happiness is to be measured in the context of a 
community, then individual actions that cause an individual harm, while at the same 
time producing a greater happiness for the community, would be determined to be 
"right". 
Justice as fairness is a deontological approach in that it does not determine an 
action to be right if it maximizes a previously and independently defined good. In other 
words, it does not rely upon the consequences of an action as a basis for determining 
what is good. Instead, a principle of equal liberty is agreed to be right prior to any 
knowledge of what the particular consequences of adhering to this principle would be. 
Rawls states, 
Hence in justice as fairness one does not take men's propensities 
and inclinations as given, whatever they are, and then seek the best 
way to fulfill them. Rather, their desires and aspirations are 
2'MiIl, John Stuart. 1861. "Utilitarianism." Classics of Western Philosophy, Third Edition. 
Ed. Steven M. Cabn. Cambridge, MA: Hackett Publishing Company, 1977. 1063­
1104. 
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restricted from the outset by the principles ofjustice which specifY 
the boundaries that men's systems ofends must respect.. .injustice 
as fairness the concept of right is prior to that of the good.29 
To further contrast this theoretical difference between classic utilitarianism and 
justice as fairness, it is useful to examine the example of slavery. This example 
provides an illustration of one of the difficulties Rawls finds with utilitarianism and 
individual liberties. If a vast majority of individuals derived great happiness from the 
enslavement of a minority of individuals, Mill's greatest happiness principle would 
determine that slavery was right. However, Rawls finds that such a situation would be 
incompatible with justice as fairness as it would clearly violate the first principle of 
equal liberty. Therefore, Rawls maintains that, "... the interests requiring the violation of 
justice have no value. Having no merit in the first place, they cannot override its 
claims." 30 More specifically, Rawls contends that classic utilitarianism denies any 
inviolable individual rights. On the contrary, classic utilitarianism allows for an 
individuals' happiness to interfere with the liberties of others. He contrasts this aspect 
of classic utilitarianism to justice as fairness by stating, "Each person possesses an 
inviolability founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot 
override." 31 
Another theoretical difference between classic utilitarianism and justice as 
fairness is the way in which the principles of a society are evaluated. Rawls contends 
~wls, p. 31. 
"'Ibid., p. 31. 
3%id., p. 3. 
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that on a basic level it is easy to assume that the most reasonable concept of justice is 
utilitarian. Following the utilitarian doctrine, it is right for a person to advance her/his 
own ends, in so far as it doesn't affect others. Taking this doctrine further, to the 
societal level, it would be reasonable to assume that what works for one person could 
work for an aggregate of individuals. In this situation, the actions of a law maker and an 
ordinary citizen would be weighted equally; in each situation the actions of the 
individual determines the allocation of basic liberties and social goods for the whole. 
Rawls finds difficulty with this point stating, "Utilitarianism does not take seriously the 
distinction between persons." 32 
In Ubera/ Equality, Amy Gutmann examines the egalitarian implications of Rawls' 
justice as faimess. 33 She explains that a moral theory is considered to be egalitarian if 
it, "...on the whole recommends a more equal distribution of goods (broadly defined) 
and opportunities than exists within the society to which it is addressed by the theorist 
or by the student applying it at a different time. "34 Therefore, Gutmann maintains that 
when applied to current Anglo-American societies, Rawls' theory has egalitarian 
implications in both its substance and scope. Gutmann explains that Rawls 
incorporates a classical liberal position on the equalization of liberties with, "...a 
potentially radically egalitarian stance on maximizing the worth (or positive side) of 
32Ibid., p. 27. 
"Gutmann, Amy. 1980. Liberal Equality. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press. 
"Ibid., p. 2. 
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liberty to the worst off within any given society...35 In addition, Gutmann contends that 
once Rawls establishes the first principle of equal liberties, the difference principle 
implies that absolute equality in the distribution of primary social goods would be an 
equitable policy. Gutmann proposes that there should be an egalitarian addition to 
Rawls' first principle of justice. She asserts that in addition to basic liberties there are 
certain basic goods and services that are also necessary in order for an individual to 
advance her/his ends. These goods and services would include education and job 
training, housing and employment, medical care and legal services. 
By their nature, both legal and medical care rather frequently 
require large amounts of money at unpredictable times during most 
people's lifetimes...Therefore, granting that people within the 
original position are for good reason risk-averse agents, a strong 
case can be made either for distributing services in kind or for 
providing payments tied to the satisfaction of medical and legal 
needs.36 
Gutmann contends that the distribution of legal and medical services would be a 
rational decision within the original position. This egalitarian addition to the first 
principle of justice would give welfare rights a higher priority and would provide the 
means to obtain what she calls a basic effective liberty. This basic effective liberty is 
defined as the combination of formal liberties with basic welfare rights. 
Rawls' theory of justice presents a more holistic approach to social policy­
making than the current system seems to provide. Rather than focusing upon the 
reciprocal interest in providing for and uplifting the status of the poor, policy makers 
"Ibid., p. 124.
 
36Ibid., p. 126.
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have instead focused upon the cost-ineffectiveness of current welfare programs. Since 
individuals are naturally unequal in different areas, Rawls asserts that the members of 
society who hold a higher economic status must make periodic compensation to those 
who are in a lesser position. In doing this, those who hold lower positions in society will 
find their position enhanced. Rawls explains that there is a reciprocal interest in 
uplifting the status of the lower economic class: 
...a society should try to avoid the region where the marginal contributions of 
those better off to the well being of the less favored are negative. It should operate 
on the upward rising part of the contribution curve...there is a natural sense in 
which the harmony of social interests is achieved...Once a society goes beyond the 
maximum it operates along the downward loping part of the curve and a harmony 
of interests no longer exists. As the more favored gain the less advantaged lose, 
and vice versa37 . 
However, in keeping with the United States Constitution, the right of the individual 
liberty interferes with Rawls' notion of a fundamental right to the minimum social 
goods38. 
In recent welfare reform proposals, there has been a trend towards restructuring 
the welfare system by limiting government commitments to the poor while maintaining 
assistance to the truly needy. This trend reflects a return to the ideas about the worthy 
and the unworthy poor present during the time of the Elizabethan Poor Laws. The 
Elizabethan Poor Laws were adopted in the early 1600's in England and traveled to 
37 Ibid., p. 104-105. 
38 According to Rawls' opportunity principle, individual members of society must 
contribute to the welfare ofthe less advantaged. The constitution does not prescribe this 
contribution as a duty of the individual. Contributing to the well being ofothers may be viewed as 
interfering with an individual's right to liberty. 
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America with the colonists. Under these laws, the unemployed were required to return 
to their place of origin if they were unable to secure employment elsewhere. There 
were facilities for the "worthy poor" who were either incompetent or physically unable to 
work, and work programs for persons who were able to work. Criminal penalties were 
imposed upon unemployed persons who refused to take part in work programs. In 
addition, the children of the poor could be taken away from their families and made to 
work as reimbursement for the cost of their parents' idleness.39 
There has however, been a change in the public's definition of the unworthy 
poor. Social insurance programs, which were originally perceived as programs that had 
been earned through contribution through taxes, have recently become the target of 
budget cutting reforms. Traditionally, social insurance programs were designed for the 
worthy poor. However, because of the increase in disability claims, many persons 
receiving this social insurance are considered to be members of the unworthy poor. 
Women have also become the new class of the unworthy poor. Because of the 
nature and scope of persons receiving AFDC benefits, this public assistance program 
is often said to encourage the "welfare" lifestyle. AFDC provides cash benefits for 
parents in low income households, and increases according to the number of children 
living in the household. Because the majority of children receiving AFDC benefits live in 
female-headed, single-parent households, many critics of the current welfare system 
maintain that AFDC benefits are rewarding women for having additional children. 
39 Lafrance, A.B. Welfare Law' Structure and Entitlement in a Nut Shell. St. Paul, MN: 
West Publishing Company. (1979) p. 1-3. 
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The Personal Responsibility and Work Reconciliation Act of 199640 contains 
multiple reductions aimed towards reducing the number un-wed and teenaged mothers, 
as well as discouraging women currently on welfare from having more children. In 
addition, there has been a resurgence in work incentive programs that aim to enable 
these women to earn an income and eventually leave the welfare system. The State of 
Wisconsin recently implemented changes to its state welfare policy and has become a 
model for national welfare reform. These changes include time limits for individuals 
receiving welfare benefits, mandatory participation in workfare programs, and a 
reduction in additional benefits for women currently receiving welfare who become 
pregnant and have more children. The Wisconsin example has been hailed as a 
solution to the problem of the increasing number of individuals receiving welfare 
benefits. However, what the Wisconsin example lacks is a Rawlsian examination of the 
structural forces influencing unemployment, unaffordable child care, teenaged 
pregnancy, un-wed motherhood, and the fatherhood-and-f1ight syndrome 
Examining current American welfare reform issues within the theoretical 
framework of Rawls' justice as fairness, policy makers must first concentrate upon the 
underlying structure of social institutions. An agent situated within the original position 
would first ensure that each individual holds an equal right to the most far-reaching 
basic liberties possible, in as much as can be compatible with a similar liberty for other 
individuals. Because the United States constitution dictates a principle of equality 
similar to Rawls' first principle of justice, I maintain that for practical purposes we can 
40 Public Law 104-193, HR 3734, 42 U.S. 1305. 
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assume that this principle has been satisfied, at least in theory. When this principle of 
equality is satisfied, the agent would then examine the social and economic inequalities 
existing in American society. In an attempt to satisfy the difference principle, 
recommendations for welfare reform would concentrate upon the measure of 
inequalities produced by existing social institutions. The current American welfare 
system would fail miserably because the inequalities are not arranged so that the least 
advantaged in society can reasonably expect to benefit from them. Instead, the 
American welfare system has been designed in such a way that the most advantaged 
in society will suffer the least from existing inequalities. 
Until the focus shifts from maintaining the status of the rich, to improving the 
status of the poor, a Rawlsian distributive justice as fairness will never be realized. The 
current welfare reform debate has primarily focused upon the unworthy poor, their 
inability to support themselves, and the burden that the least advantaged place upon 
the most advantaged in society. Therefore, the implications of examining welfare 
reform within the justice as fairness paradigm would force the American public to view 
the systematic institutional failures of public assistance, rather than the failure of 
individuals to overcome the obstacles that this failed system has put before them. 
XIX
 
